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The enforcement of EC rights against national authorities and the influence of 
Köbler and Kühne & Heitz on Italian administrative law: opening Pandora’s box? 
 
Mariolina Eliantonio1 
 
Abstract: The paper analyses the impact of the Köbler and the Kühne & Heitz rulings on 
Italian system of administrative justice. These rulings, issued recently by the European 
Court of Justice, set out new obligations for national courts and administrative bodies 
with respect to (i) the principle of State liability for violations of EC law committed by 
national courts adjudicating at last instance and (ii) the obligation to re-examine final 
administrative decisions, which have been adopted in violation of EC law. The purpose 
of the contribution is to evaluate whether, in the Italian legal system, these rulings could 
potentially bring any changes in the current rules or have contributed to trigger a process 
of change, or whether the relevant national provisions already provide a sufficient 
standard of protection for individuals’ rights. 
 
Keywords: European law, Italian administrative law, domestic enforcement of EC law, 
State liability, annulment of administrative measures 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It was 1993 when Roberto Caranta, a distinguished Italian administrative law professor, 
commented upon a request for a preliminary ruling sent by the Regional Administrative 
Court of Lombardia, concerning the compatibility with European law of a national 
procedural rule which prevented the administrative judge from asking an independent 
expert to carry out a technical assessment in the context of the judicial fact-finding 
                                                 
1
 PhD Researcher, Maastricht University, Faculty of Law. This paper is an improved and updated version 
of the author’s contribution presented at the Workshop on Public Law held during the yearly Ius Commune 
congress (Edinburgh, 1-2 December 2005). The author would like to thank Prof. Dr. E. Vos for her useful 
comments on earlier drafts of this contribution. 
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activity2. The case came to be known, albeit not with the same degree of fame as other 
preliminary rulings, as the case Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava3. 
 
These are Caranta’s somewhat “prophetical” words: “What could simply look like a mere 
action for annulment against measures concerning the location of waste discharge plants 
seems to be capable, in the hands of a Europe-friendly court, to give rise to new and 
extremely complex problems. If this is indeed the case, it seems difficult to deny that the 
integration of our system of administrative justice in the EC legal system represents the 
legal equivalent of opening Pandora’s box”4. 
 
Recently, two cases delivered by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have somehow 
contributed to flesh out the Community “mandate”5 of national courts and administrations 
and have called in question the well known principle of national procedural autonomy: 
the Köbler case extended the principle of State liability also vis-à-vis the judiciary6, while 
the Kühne & Heitz ruling set out a duty for administrative authorities to re-examine final 
administrative measures, which were adopted in violation of EC law. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of these rulings on the Italian system of 
administrative justice, in order to evaluate whether they could potentially bring any 
changes in the current rules or have contributed to trigger a process of change, or whether 
the relevant national provisions already provide a sufficient standard of protection for 
individuals’ rights. After this analysis, some conclusions are drawn as to whether, and to 
what extent, it could be argued, as Caranta predicted 10 years ago, that, with these two 
much debated rulings, the ECJ did indeed open Pandora’s box and, if so, whether “all the 
evil of the world” came out of it, just like in the Greek myth of Pandora. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 R. Caranta, ‘Nuove questioni su diritto comunitario e forme di tutela giurisdizionale’, Giur. It., 1993, Vol. 
3A, 657. 
3
 Case C-236/92, Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava and others v. Regione Lombardia 
[1994] ECR I-00483. 
4
 R. Caranta, supra note 2, 660. Please note that the translation does not have official character. 
5
 M. Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart, 2005). 
6 Case C-224/01, Gerhard Köbler v. Austria [2003] ECR I-10239. 
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2. State liability for violations of EC law committed by national supreme courts 
 
As is well known, the ECJ’s ruling in the Köbler case extended the principle of State 
liability also vis-à-vis the judiciary. On the basis of the principle of effective judicial 
protection, the ECJ held that Member States may be called upon making good damages 
suffered by individuals as a result of a violation of EC law committed by national courts 
adjudicating at last instance. Although ruled with specific reference to a case litigated 
before the Austrian courts, the outcome of the Köbler case can be of great significance 
for the Italian legal system, because it calls in question one of the founding principles 
governing the activity of the judiciary, namely the exclusion of liability for errors 
committed when interpreting the applicable law. 
 
In the Italian legal system, State liability for judicial errors is governed by Law of 13 
April 1988 No. 117 (“Law No. 117/88”), which is applicable to the activities of all 
courts, including therefore administrative courts7. This law was passed after a referendum 
with which the previous regime of liability was repealed. Before the referendum, the 
liability for judicial errors was governed by Articles 55, 56 and 74 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, pursuant to which an unlawful behaviour of a judge could never give rise to 
liability for the State, but only for the judge him/herself. Moreover, the judge could be 
held personally liable only if he/she had violated the law intentionally, or if he/she was 
found guilty of fraud or corruption. 
 
The main change introduced with Law No. 117/88 is the shift of focus of the liability 
from the judge to the State. Moreover, pursuant to this law the liability of the State for 
judicial errors can arise in cases in which the court has acted and breached the applicable 
law intentionally or with gross negligence. However, the liability of courts can never 
arise in cases concerning the activity of interpretation of the applicable law, the fact-
finding activity or the evaluation of evidence8. This limitation of liability finds its 
                                                 
7
 Article 1 of Law of 13 April 1988 No. 117. The text of this law can be found at 
http://www.giustizia.it/cassazione/leggi/l117_88.html. 
8
 Article 2 of Law No. 177/88. For a general comment on this law, see R. Conti, ‘Giudici supremi e 
responsabilitá per violazione del diritto comunitario’, Danno e Resp., 2004, 32 ff. 
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rationale in the constitutional guarantee of independence of the judiciary9. In this respect, 
the Constitutional Court did not doubt the constitutionality of these rules and, indeed, 
considered that the constitutional independence of the judiciary implies a necessity to 
guarantee an adequate degree of autonomy in evaluating the facts and the evidence, and 
of impartiality in interpreting the law10. 
 
Assuming that these provisions would be applied also to cases of a claim for 
compensation against the State for damages suffered as a result of a violation of EC law 
committed by judicial authorities11, it is necessary to consider whether, in the light of the 
Köbler ruling, they respect the principle of effective judicial protection, as elaborated by 
the ECJ’s case law. 
 
Before analysing the compliance with EC law of the Italian rules, it is interesting to note 
that the Italian judges already thought of this problem of compatibility themselves: in a 
case that resembles in many ways the factual situation at stake in Köbler, the Civil Court 
of Genoa asked the ECJ to express its opinion on the Italian rules concerning the 
exclusion of liability for cases of errors not committed intentionally or with gross 
negligence, and for errors related to the interpretation of the law and the evaluation of 
facts12. On 11 October 2005, Advocate General Léger issued his opinion on the matter13 
and on 13 June 2006 the ECJ delivered its judgment on the matter14. 
 
                                                 
9
 Article 104 of the Italian Constitution. 
10
 Corte Cost., 18 January 1989, No. 18, Giust. Pen., 1990, I, 23. 
11
 The abstract applicability of Law No. 117/88 also to cases concerning EC law was affirmed by the Civil 
Court of Rome on the basis of the principle of national procedural autonomy, pursuant to which, once a 
violation of EC law is established, the procedural conditions on which State liability may be enforced are 
governed by national law. Trib. Roma, 28 June 2001, Mediobanca-Banca di Credito Finanziario S.p.A. e 
Vincenzo Maranghi v. Repubblica Italiana, Giur. Merito, 2002, 360. Please note that this case was decided 
before the ECJ’s ruling in Köbler. 
12
 To be completely accurate, it must be pointed out that the question was sent to the ECJ before the ruling 
in Köbler was issued and contained also a further question, concerning in general the existence of a 
principle of State liability for damages suffered by individuals for violations of EC law committed by 
national supreme courts. In the light of the ruling in Köbler, this question was withdrawn so that only the 
more specific question concerning the Italian rules was kept before the ECJ. 
13
 Opinion of Advocate General on case C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. Italian Republic 
[2006] ECR  00000. 
14
 Case C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. Italian Republic, [2006] ECR 00000. 
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It is worth emphasising that the circumstances of the Köbler case are very similar to those 
at stake before the Italian Civil Court, apart from the fact that the story does not take 
place in the Austrian Alps, but in the sunny harbours of Genoa and Naples. In the Italian 
case, a company operating ferries (Traghetti del Mediterraneo) had requested 
compensation from a competitor company (Tirrenia), on the ground that the latter had 
dumped its fares in the transport activities between continental Italy and Sicily and 
Sardinia, because, the applicant argued, the competitor had obtained State aid, which, in 
its view, was in violation of the relevant rules of EC law. 
 
All courts up until the Court of Cassation rejected the claim and considered that the State 
aid in question was not in violation of EC law. All courts, moreover, denied the 
applicant’s request for a preliminary question to be referred to the ECJ, considering that 
the relevant EC rules had already been sufficiently interpreted by the European court. 
After the ruling of the Court of Cassation in last instance, however, the European 
Commission decided to open a proceeding against Tirrenia and issued a decision 
highlighting the conditions which the aid in question should fulfil in order to be 
considered compatible with the EC Treaty. 
 
The company then brought a liability claim to the Civil Court of Genoa against Italy for 
the erroneous judgment issued by the Court of Cassation, arguing that, if the Court of 
Cassation had duly requested the ECJ to become involved in the dispute via the 
preliminary reference tool, the outcome would have been in its favour, especially in the 
light of the later Commission decision. Italy contested this claim arguing that, pursuant to 
the rules of Italian law mentioned above, there can be no liability in such cases since the 
error occurred in the context of the interpretation of the applicable law. To this statement 
the company replied that these procedural rules are in breach of EC law, because they 
render the exercise of Community rights impossible in practice. 
 
Therefore, the Italian court, very wisely, decided to stay proceedings and refer the ECJ a 
question concerning the compatibility of the relevant Italian rules with EC law. More in 
particular, the Italian court asked whether the rules providing for the exclusion of State 
 8 
liability for judicial errors falling within the scope of the activity of finding the facts and 
interpreting the applicable law, and anyway for those errors that are not a result of 
intention or gross negligence, are, indeed, to be considered in breach of the principle of 
effective judicial protection. 
 
Preliminarily, it should be stressed that the conclusions of Advocate General Léger 
should not come as a surprise and, instead, they quite straightforwardly follow from the 
previous case law of the ECJ on State liability15. Indeed, the Advocate General recalled 
that several objections were raised against the principle set out in Köbler (such as the 
independence of the judiciary, the authority of res iudicata and so on) and that the ECJ 
dismissed all these arguments. From this basis, he concluded that a rule such as that at 
stake (excluding State liability when the error of the court is connected to the 
interpretation of the law and the fact-finding activity) basically deprives of all effects the 
ruling in Köbler, since it is exactly in those circumstances that most often a violation of 
EC law by the supreme courts is likely to occur16. As far as the limitation connected to the 
intentional or grossly negligent nature of the error, the Advocate General recalled the 
ruling of the ECJ in Köbler, where it was held that the liability arises where the error was 
committed in “manifest violation” of the applicable law. Cautiously, the Advocate 
General concluded that the requirement of intention or gross negligence is not in breach 
of effective judicial protection per se, but it cannot be interpreted as setting a higher 
threshold than the one of the “manifest violation of the applicable law”17. This conclusion 
does not seem to be innovative, since Advocate General Léger had highlighted already in 
Köbler that the concepts of intention or gross negligence may have different meanings in 
the various Member States and may imply a too heavy burden of proof on the individual, 
thus expressing his preference for a more objective criterion based on the manifest nature 
of the violation. 
 
                                                 
15
 See cases C-46/93 and 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany and The Queen v. Secretary of State 
for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-1029. 
16
 Opinion of Advocate General, in particular para. 64. 
17
 Opinion of Advocate General, para. 102. 
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The ECJ fully endorsed the Advocate General’s Opinion and rules that the exclusion of 
liability for errors committed by national supreme courts when interpreting the law and 
assessing the facts and the evidence is to be considered in breach of EC law. Concerning 
the requirement of intention or gross negligence, the ECJ did not explicitly deal with the 
Italian rules at stake, but reinstated that the threshold for liability cannot be higher than 
the one of “manifest violation of the applicable law”. 
 
In the light of the ruling in Köbler and Traghetti, it is essential to assess if and to what 
extent the relevant Italian rules comply with the principle of effective judicial protection. 
It is well-established, indeed, that the procedural conditions with which individuals can 
bring a liability claim against the State in the national courts, are governed by national 
rules. This means that  individuals who wish to bring a claim for compensation against 
the Italian State for an alleged violation of EC law committed by an Italian court 
adjudicating at last instance should do so according to the procedural modalities provided 
for in Law No. 117/88. However, these rules may only be applied by the national courts 
provided that they comply with the principles of equivalence and of effectiveness18. 
 
As regards the principle of equivalence, it can be observed that Law No. 117/88 does not 
discriminate between claims based on EC law and claims based on national law and 
hence seems in compliance with the ECJ’s case law on domestic remedies. A different 
conclusion must be drawn, however, with regard to the principle of effectiveness. The 
two limitations of liability discussed above are considered in turn. In relation to the 
subjective element of liability, it must be pointed out that the ECJ’s ruling in Köbler did 
not consider intention or gross negligence as essential prerequisites for liability, but 
rather as elements to be taken into account to assess the gravity of the violation of EC law 
committed by the court19. Therefore, the Italian rule that provides that only errors 
committed with intention or gross negligence can give rise to liability, seems to be in 
breach of EC law. However, in Traghetti the ECJ added that this rule is not in violation 
                                                 
18
 See cases 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland 
[1976] ECR 1989; case 45/76, Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043; case C-
312/93 Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v. Belgium [1995] ECR I-4599. 
19
 Köbler, para. 55. 
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of Community law per se, as long as it is not interpreted as setting a higher threshold than 
the one of “manifest violation of the applicable law”20. It could therefore be possible to 
consider this provision in compliance with EC law, so long as it could be interpreted in a 
“Community-friendly” way. Pursuant to Article 2(3)(a) of Law No. 117/88, gross 
negligence includes also a serious violation of law determined by an inexcusable error: 
the concept of gross negligence could be interpreted as including also the cases of 
violation of EC law, thereby saving this rule from the “European scythe” and at the same 
time respecting the European standards of protection21. 
 
The other rule at stake, relating to the exclusion of liability for errors committed in the 
interpretation of the law and in the fact-finding activity cannot, however, be interpreted in 
a way consistent with the ECJ’s rulings in Köbler and in Traghetti22. As the Advocate 
General pointed out in his opinion in Traghetti, indeed, this rule turns the principle of 
State liability into an empty shell, since it is exactly when interpreting the law that most 
often a violation of EC law would occur23. This means that, in order to comply with the 
principle of effective judicial protection, this Italian rule would need to be set aside by the 
national courts when a claim is brought for an alleged breach of EC law committed by an 
Italian court adjudicating at last instance. 
 
As a consequence, notwithstanding the national procedural rules, under the regime of 
liability set out by the ECJ, the Italian State would be held liable to pay compensation to 
an individual if a court adjudicating at last instance misinterpreted EC law because of an 
inexcusable error. It appears hard to predict how the Italian courts will react to the idea of 
the limitation of liability being swept away by the ECJ. One of the greatest difficulty in 
the reception of the newly set Community standards will be the usual and well-known 
problem of the creation of a double standard of protection according to the source of 
                                                 
20
 Traghetti, para 44. 
21
 R. Conti, supra note 8, 35. See also G. Di Federico, ‘Risarcimento del singolo per violazione del diritto 
comunitario da parte dei giudici nazionali: il cerchio si chiude?’, Riv. Dir. Int. Priv. Proc., 2004, 155. 
22
 For an attempt, though rather vague, of a Community-friendly interpretation of this Italian rule, see R. 
Conti, supra note 8, 36; for the non applicability altogether of Law No. 117/88, see E. Scoditti, ‘Francovich 
presa sul serio: la responsabilitá dello Stato per violazione del diritto comunitario’, Foro It., 2004, IV, 4. 
23
 Opinion of Advocate General, in particular para. 64. 
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individuals’ rights24. In this way, individuals claiming compensation for a judicial error 
infringing on rights derived from EC law would be allowed to profit from less strict 
procedural conditions than individuals whose domestic rights have been allegedly 
infringed. For this reason, a legislative intervention seems to be appropriate, in order to 
adapt the relevant national rules to the ECJ’s prescriptions. In the meantime, it would be 
advisable, in application of the principle of equality, that national courts afford the same 
(less strict) treatment also to individuals founding their claims merely on national law. 
 
3. Revocation of final administrative measures adopted in violation of EC law 
 
The Kühne & Heitz case is of exemplary importance for the analysis of the “Community 
mandate” incumbent upon administrative authorities.  
 
The case concerned the claim brought by Kühne & Heitz, a company exporting poultry 
meat parts, against the Dutch customs authorities. In the declarations lodged with these 
authorities, Kühne & Heitz designated its goods as falling under a certain subheading of 
the customs tariff. On the basis of those declarations, it was granted export refunds. 
Subsequently, however, the customs office reclassified the goods under a different 
subheading and ordered the company to give back large sums of money. An appeal by 
Kühne & Heitz against this decision was dismissed without any question being raised 
under Article 234 EC as to the proper meaning of the relevant subheadings of the 
customs tariff. Some time later, however, the ECJ did rule upon the subheadings in 
question and interpreted the provisions in a manner which implied that the company 
should not have had to repay the refunds granted. Following that judgment, Kühne & 
Heitz asked the customs authority for the payment of the refunds which the latter had, in 
its view, wrongly required it to reimburse. Confronted with a refusal, the company 
brought a claim against the customs office. The competent Dutch court asked the Court 
of Justice whether under Community law, in particular under Article 10 EC, an 
administrative body is required to reopen a decision which has become final in order to 
                                                 
24
 M. Magrassi, ‘Il principio della responsabilitá risarcitoria dello Stato-giudice tra ordinamento 
comunitario, interno e convenzionale’, Dir. Pubb. Comp. Eur., 2004, 500; A. Damato, ‘Cancellato il limite 
che subordina l’azione alla dimostrazione del dolo o colpa grave’, Guida al Dir., 4/2006, 39. 
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ensure the application of Community law, as it is to be interpreted in the light of a 
subsequent preliminary ruling. 
 
In its judgment, the ECJ held that the principle of loyal cooperation entails the duty for 
national authorities to re-examine a final administrative decision, where an application 
for such review is made to it, in order to take into account a ruling of the ECJ, even after 
the decision has acquired the quality of res iudicata. However, according to the European 
Court, this duty arises only provided that some requirements are met, namely that (i) 
under national law, the authority in question has the power to reopen that decision; (ii) 
the administrative decision in question has become final as a result of a judgment of 
national court ruling at final instance; (iii) the judgment is, in the light of a later decision 
given by the ECJ, based on a misinterpretation of Community law; and (iv) the person 
concerned complained to the administrative body “immediately after” becoming aware of 
that decision of the European Court. 
 
Under Italian administrative law, the possibility for the administration to re-examine its 
own decisions falls within the scope of the category of the so-called “autotutela”. There 
seems to be no adequate translation for this term in English: however, Galetta, an Italian 
administrative law scholar, during a presentation held at the European University 
Institute, used the term “administrative self-remedy”, which is adhered to in this paper25. 
 
First of all, it seems necessary to point out that, unlike many other countries, for a very 
long time there has been no explicit legislative support for the powers of administrative 
self-remedy. However, it has always been undisputed that Italian administrative 
authorities do have the power to come back to their previously adopted decisions. This 
power has been codified only less than a year ago26. The absence, for many years, of 
statutory rules on administrative self-remedy has brought about the consequence that the 
                                                 
25
 An account of this debate can be found at page 48 of the round table proceedings that can retrieved at 
http://www.iue.it/PUB/law05-10.pdf . 
26
 Article 21-nonies of Law of 7 August 1990, No. 241, as modified by Law of 11 February 2005, No. 15. 
The latest version is to be found at http://www.giustizia.it/cassazione/leggi/l241_90.html#TESTO. 
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criteria and requirements for its exercise could only be found in the case law of the 
Council of State. 
 
Under Italian administrative law, there are two main types of decision of self-remedy: the 
revoca and the annullamento d’ufficio. For the purposes of the present analysis, the focus 
is to be placed on the second of these two tools, since the revoca can be used by the 
administrative authorities when the decision is valid but no longer fulfills the public 
interest objectives it was meant to pursue. 
 
The annullamento d’ufficio, which can be translated with the term “administrative 
annulment”, is subject to two preconditions: (i) the measure to be annulled must be 
invalid and (ii) there should be a real and concrete interest in the annulment. With the 
latter requirement reference is made to the fact that it is not enough that the measure to be 
annulled is invalid, since the authority must also consider if there is a public interest that 
specifically requires the annulment and that prevails over other conflicting interests, such 
as legal certainty27. 
 
The Kühne & Heitz ruling seems to have an impact on three different aspects of the 
Italian rules on administrative self-annulment. These aspects are analysed in turn. 
 
3.1 Discretion vs. obligation to annul 
 
The first aspect in relation to which the Kühne & Heitz ruling could potentially clash with 
the relevant Italian rules, concerns the second of the two requirements necessary for an 
administrative authority to annul its own decisions, namely that there should be a real and 
concrete public interest in the annulment. More in particular, the question arises whether 
this requirement applies also when the administrative measure is invalid because of a 
violation of EC law, or whether, because of the supremacy of EC law and the duty of 
loyal cooperation, the administrative annulment should not be subject to a discretionary 
                                                 
27
 In general on the administrative annulment see F. Benvenuti, Autotutela, Enc. Dir., IV (Milano, 1959), 
537 ff. 
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assessment of conflicting interests and should instead be seen as an obligation to annul 
the invalid measure on the part of the authorities. 
 
The argument according to which the authorities should always proceed to the 
administrative annulment of a measure in violation of EC law (regardless of the weighing 
up of conflicting interests) was upheld by the Council of State28. In particular, the Council 
of State has held that, in case of invalidity deriving from the violation of EC rules, the 
public interest in the annulment of the measure is not only to be considered as always 
prevailing over all other private interests in the preservation of the measure, but also as 
inherent in the invalidity of the measure. In such cases, therefore, there should be no need 
to carry out the balancing exercise between the public interest in the removal of the 
measure and the private interests in its preservation. 
 
The opposite thesis, according to which administrative authorities should always verify 
whether there is a public interest in the annulment of the measure (also when the measure 
is breach of EC law) is supported by another line of case law and accepted by some 
scholars29. The ruling in Kühne & Heitz now seems to give support to the thesis according 
to which EC law does not require an authority to necessarily annul a final administrative 
measure where it appears that this measure violates EC law. What the ECJ set outs, 
indeed, is a duty to re-examine final administrative measures, but not a duty to annul 
them30. In other words, the mere fact that the measure is in violation of EC law does not 
imply, in the Court’s view, that the authorities have to annul the measure; on the contrary, 
the ECJ clarified that the administrative annulment remains subject to a balancing 
exercise with the other conflicting interests. 
                                                 
28
 Cons. Stato, Sez. IV, 18 January 1996, No. 54, Riv. It. Dir. Pubbl.Com., 1997, 117; Cons. Stato, Sez. V, 
18 April 1996, No. 447, Riv. It. Dir. Pubbl.Com., 1997, 186; Cons. Stato, Sez. IV, 5 June 1998, No. 918, 
Urb. e App, 1998, 1343.  
29
 TAR Lazio, Sez. III, 7 October 1996, No. 1834, Urb. e App., 1997, 332; R. Garofoli, ‘Annullamento di 
atto amministrativo contrastante con norme CE self-executing’, Urb. e App., 1997, 340; R. Garofoli, 
‘Concessione di lavori: discrezionalitá del potere di annullamento d’ufficio e vincoli comunitari’,  Urb. e 
App, 1998, 1344. More recently, see also S. Valaguzza, ‘La concretizzazione dell’interesse pubblico nella 
recente giurisprudenza amministrativa in tema di annullamento d’ufficio’, Dir. Proc. Amm., 2004, 1261; D. 
De Pretis, ‘'Illegittimità comunitaria' dell'atto amministrativo definitivo, certezza del diritto e potere di 
riesame’, Giorn. Dir. Amm., 2004, 727. 
30
 A. Massera, ‘I principi generali dell’azione amministrativa tra ordinamento nazionale e ordinamento 
comunitario’, Dir. Amm., 2005, 743. 
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This is surely not surprising: in fact, it would have been surprising if the Court had 
declared the existence of an absolute duty for the authorities to annul measures in breach 
of EC law, since the Court itself, with reference to the administrative self-remedy powers 
of the Community institutions, has opted for a system of discretion as to whether an 
invalid measure should be subject to administrative annulment. More in particular, the 
ECJ has held, already as early as 1967 in the famous Algera case, that administrative 
annulment can only be carried out within a reasonable period of time31. Concerning the 
weighing up of interests, the Court held in S.N.U.P.A.T. that the mere invalidity of a 
measure is not enough for the Community institutions to proceed to its annulment and 
that, instead, the administrative annulment by Community institutions should always 
follow an evaluation of the public interest in the annulment and its weighing up with the 
conflicting private interests involved32. 
 
Therefore, it is time for the Council of State to revise its approach to the obligation to 
annul an administrative decision when EC law was violated and, place more importance, 
as the ECJ itself does and has clearly stated in Kühne & Heitz, on the private interests 
involved, and in particular on the legitimate expectations of all concerned parties33. 
 
3.2 The scope of res iudicata 
 
Apart from the debate concerning the discretionary nature of the administrative 
annulment when EC law is at stake, the ruling in Kühne & Heitz may have an impact on 
Italian law also from a second perspective. Indeed, it is settled case law34 that the power 
of the administration to re-examine and annul its decisions cannot be exercised in those 
cases in which the measure has been subject of an action for annulment, it has been 
                                                 
31
 Joined cases 7/56, 3/57 to 7/57, Algera v. Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community 
[1957] ECR 00039. The same was held also in case 15/85, Consorzio Cooperative d’Abruzzo v. 
Commission [1987] ECR 1005 and in case 14/81, Alpha Steel Ltd. v Commission [1982] ECR 749. 
32
 Joined cases 42 and 49/59, S.N.U.P.A.T. v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
[1961] ECR 00053; more recently, Case C-90/95, de Compte v. European Parliament [1997] ECR I-01999; 
case C-229/88, Cargill BV and others v. Commission [1990] ECR I-01303. 
33
 Of the same opinion S. Valaguzza, supra note 28, 1267. 
34
 Ex multis, Cons. Stato, Sez. V, 12 March 2003, No. 3965, Foro Amm., CDS, 2003, 2234. 
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considered valid and this ruling has become res iudicata35. If this seems quite 
straightforward, it is not so when looking at the details. 
 
First of all, there is still debate as to whether a ruling of rejection of an action for 
annulment is suitable at all to create a res iudicata. The Council of State, indeed, argued 
that a ruling of rejection of the applicant’s claim for annulment cannot become res 
iudicata in a substantial sense, since it does produce any constitutive or innovative effects 
vis-à-vis the legal relationship between the parties, but it simply declares ungrounded the 
claim brought by the individual36. If this line of interpretation is to be followed, the 
consequence is that it is always possible for the administration to annul a measure that 
has been the subject matter of a judicial claim, since the res iudicata problem does not 
stand in the way37. 
 
This view is opposed by the majority of scholars and of the case law, who argue that 
there should be no difference between a ruling which upholds and a ruling which rejects 
the applicant’s claim, since the value of res iudicata cannot change and mutate according 
to the content of the court’s ruling. For those who support this view, therefore, the power 
of authorities to annul administrative measures is limited to those parts of the measure, 
which have not become res iudicata38. 
 
This raises then a second problem, connected to the limits of the res iudicata. Namely, 
the question arises as to whether the res iudicata of rejection covers all grounds that 
could possibly be related to the measure or only those grounds brought forward by the 
applicant. Some case law seems to extend the res iudicata to all possible grounds of 
unlawfulness of the challenged measure, applying by analogy the rule concerning the 
extension of the res iudicata in civil disputes39. This brings about the consequence that 
                                                 
35
 With the expression res iudicata reference is made to the principle according to which a final judgment 
of a competent court is conclusive upon the parties and can no longer be modified. 
36
 Cons. Stato, Sez. VI, 21 February 1997, No. 305, Cons. Stato 1997, I, 283. 
37
 Cons. Giust. Amm., 4 July 1986, No. 97, Cons. Stato, 1986, I, 1030. 
38
 M. Nigro, Giustizia amministrativa (Bologna, 2002), 323. 
39
 Cons. Stato, Sez. IV, 14 September 1984, No. 678, Cons. Stato, 1984, I, 1022; Cass. Civ., Sez. Un., 6 
May 1998, No. 4573, Giust. Civ., 1999, I, 211. 
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the power of administrative annulment is de facto excluded, since the res iudicata is 
given the widest possible meaning. 
 
The opponents to this view argue that the res iudicata and the grounds of unlawfulness 
brought forward by the applicant before the court should coincide, hence the 
administrative authorities should be allowed to re-examine administrative measures that 
have been subject to a ruling of rejection, but this powers can be exercised only in 
relation to those grounds which are not dealt with in the ruling, since they are not covered 
by the res iudicata40. 
 
If this view is to be adopted, one is then faced with a third problem: in a case such as that 
at stake in Kühne & Heitz, is the individual relying on a new ground or on the same 
ground of unlawfulness of the contested measure? In other words, if the contrast between 
the administrative measure and the underlying norm has been denied by the courts with a 
final judgment, but becomes apparent because of a later ruling of the ECJ, does this 
contrast create a new ground of unlawfulness, different from the one brought forward by 
the applicant and examined by the court, or is the applicant still relying on the same 
ground of unlawfulness? 
 
Now, it must be considered that in the Italian system of administrative procedural law the 
judge is bound to adjudicate only on those grounds of unlawfulness which have been duly 
and timely brought forward by the applicant. However, in application of the principle of 
iura novit curia41, it must be considered that within those grounds of unlawfulness, it 
must be the judge ex officio who finds the applicable law. Therefore, where the contrast 
between an administrative measure and the law arises after a judgment of the ECJ and 
this contrast has been previously denied by a national court, the administrative authorities 
                                                 
40
 M. Nigro, supra note 36, 324. 
41
 According to this principle the judge is obliged to find and be bound by the appropriate legal rule also 
without prompting from the parties. 
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are confronted with the same ground of unlawfulness as that adjudicated upon by the 
court, since it concerns the activity of finding the applicable law42.  
 
Therefore, it must be concluded that according to Italian law it is not possible for the 
national authorities to re-examine an administrative measure which has been the subject 
matter of a judicial claim as far as the same aspects adjudicated upon are concerned. The 
phrase “same aspects” includes, on the basis of the principle iura novit curia, also a new 
interpretation of the law on which the contested measure is based. 
 
This conclusion shows the potential effects that Kühne & Heitz could have on the Italian 
legal system, since the ECJ’s ruling seems to suggest that sufficient precondition for the 
obligation to re-examine an administrative measure in breach of EC law is the mere and 
unqualified existence of the power for the authorities, under national law, to carry out this 
re-examination. This means that, on the one hand, the ruling of the ECJ is applicable in 
the Italian legal system, because the Italian rules do grant in principle the power to 
administrative authorities to re-examine their decisions; on the other hand, however, there 
seems to be a conflict between Italian law and the ECJ’s ruling because, under Italian 
law, authorities are not allowed to reopen decisions on the same grounds on which there 
has already been a ruling and a res iudicata thereon. 
 
It thus essential to find out whether there is a way to reconcile this contrast between 
Italian law and the ruling in Kühne & Heitz. One way to tackle the problem would be to 
establish a comparison between the situation of a ruling of the ECJ that clarifies the 
meaning of an EC provision with the situation of a national law that clarifies the meaning 
of an earlier law (so-called leggi di interpretazione autentica). These situations seem to 
be comparable, since in both cases a subsequent act is issued in order to clarify the 
meaning of a precedent rule. This comparison may be useful for the purposes of the 
present analysis, because both the Council of State and the Constitutional Court have 
                                                 
42
 G. Mari, ‘La forza di giudicato delle decisioni dei giudici nazionali di ultima istanza nella giurisprudenza 
comunitaria’, Riv. It. Dir. Pubbl. Com., 2004, 1045. 
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dealt with the relationship between the res iudicata and a law that retroactively clarifies 
the meaning of an earlier law. 
 
In this respect, the Council of State has argued that the res iudicata cannot be touched by 
a later law that, with retroactive effects, interprets the rules on the basis of which the res 
iudicata was formed. The opposite conclusion would, in the court’s view, basically allow 
the legislator to undo at any point what the judiciary has done and would render judicial 
protection uncertain43. This view was also confirmed by the Court of Cassation44. 
 
Also the Constitutional Court intervened on this matter and it took a different position. In 
particular, the Court considered that the res iudicata is not and should not be immune 
from the balancing of conflicting interests that the Court itself constantly applies45. 
Therefore, also the strength of res iudicata, in the Court’s view, can and should be 
compressed and by-passed by a retroactive interpretive law, when there are other interests 
(conflicting with the principle of legal certainty), which should be granted protection. In 
other words, according to the Constitutional Court, the obligation to respect the authority 
of res iudicata and, therefore, also the powers constitutionally granted to the judiciary, do 
not automatically prevail over other values, but must always be subject to a balancing 
exercise. 
 
If this was stated in relation to a civil law case, hence a case in which the ruling satisfied 
the demands of one of the parties, it should a fortiori apply to situations in which the res 
iudicata was formed on a ruling of rejection of the annulment of a measure imposing 
obligations on the individual. If seen from this perspective, the ruling contained in Kühne 
& Heitz is probably not as revolutionary as it might have looked at first sight, and can be 
reconciled without too big a friction with the national rules. 
 
                                                 
43
 Cons Stato, Ad. Plen., 21 February 1994, No. 4, Foro It., 1994, III, 313. 
44
 Cass. Civ., Sez. Lav., 11 April 2000 No. 4630, Giust. Civ. Mass., 2000, 786. 
45
 Corte Cost., 10 November 1994, No. 385, Giust. Civ, 1995, I, 46; in the same sense Corte Cost., 30 
December 1994, No. 461, Giur. Cost., 1994, fasc. 6. 
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One last point deserves to be mentioned: while in case of a law clarifying the meaning of 
an earlier law with retroactive effect the weighing up of conflicting interests is carried out 
by the legislator once and for all and is then only subject to the constitutional review, in 
the scenario set out by Kühne & Heitz it is up to the authorities, on a case-by-case 
approach, to weigh up the applicant’s interest connected to the request of re-examination 
of the decision and the conflicting interest of legal certainty and the interests of third 
parties. If and how this is going to work in the future remains to be seen. 
 
3.3. Discretion vs. obligation to reopen 
 
Finally, the ECJ’s ruling in Kühne & Heitz can have an impact on the Italian rules on 
administrative annulment from a third point of view, apart from, firstly, the aspect of the 
discretion versus obligation to annul administrative measures adopted in violation of EC 
law, and, secondly, the possibility to by-pass the res iudicata. 
 
The analysis carried out above shows that, in relation to the first aspect discussed, not 
only does the ruling in Kühne & Heitz not bring any changes in the Italian legal system, 
but the ruling seems even to set a lower level of protection for individuals. Concerning 
the second of the aspects analysed, as explained above, there seems to be a contrast 
between the domestic rules and the standards of protection set out by the ECJ; however, 
this contrast could be solved if the ECJ’s preliminary rulings are considered as laws 
retroactively clarifying the meaning of an earlier law. 
 
However, even considering that, by using this interpretation, the ECJ’s ruling could fit 
into the national existing schemes, there is still one major problem with the outcome of 
Kühne & Heitz. 
 
From the ruling in Kühne & Heitz it seems that, while the Court did not set out a duty for 
the authorities to annul measures in breach of EC law, it did impose on national 
authorities an obligation to re-examine measures which have become final, when EC law 
has allegedly been violated. 
 21 
 
Now, under Italian law the individual does not hold a right to compel the administration 
re-examine its measures, but a mere interest46. On this point the case law is consolidated: 
the refusal by the administration to re-examine its decisions cannot be sanctioned by 
courts and the individual whose application has been rejected or ignored by the 
authorities cannot bring any claim against the administration47. This means that, 
following the ruling in Kühne & Heitz the Italian authorities can be considered obliged to 
re-examine their measures, where the invalidity of the measure is allegedly based on EC 
law. Again, this may lead to two different standards of protection and may, possibly, 
contribute to trigger a spill-over effect. 
  
4. Conclusion 
 
It is now possible to draw some conclusions from the analysis carried out above and 
assess whether, with the Köbler and the Kühne & Heitz rulings the ECJ did indeed open 
Pandora’s box, which Caranta referred to, and what came out of it for the Italian system 
of administrative justice. 
 
In relation to the Kühne & Heitz jurisprudence, the author’s impression is that Pandora’s 
box has not been opened, since, in the light of the above analysis, it can be argued that 
this ruling probably looks more revolutionary than indeed is, and can be reconciled with 
the relevant Italian rules. The only point that could create friction, as was mentioned 
above, concerns the existence of a duty for the administration to re-examine previously 
adopted decisions. However, already before the ECJ’s ruling, this point was a subject 
matter for debate: Kühne & Heitz could then work as necessary input to trigger a change 
in the Italian rules48. 
 
                                                 
46
 Apart from very limited exceptions, mainly concerning tax law matters. For this aspect see S. Muscará, 
Autotutela (diritto tributario), Enc. Giur. Treccani (Roma, 1999), 1 ff. 
47
 Cons. Stato, Sez. V, 2 February 2002, No. 1810, Foro Amm., CDS, 2002, 912. 
48
 On this point see D. U. Galetta, ‘Autotutela decisoria e diritto comunitario’, Riv. It. Dir. Pubbl. Com., 
2005, 55-56; E. Rinaldi, ‘Miracoli dei polli olandesi: la primauté del diritto comunitario va “oltre” il 
giudicato nazionale “anticomunitario”. E all’Amministrazione spetta il compito di rimediare…’, Riv. It. 
Dir. Pubbl. Com., 2005, 664. 
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As far as the Köbler ruling is concerned, it seems, instead, that Pandora’s box has indeed 
been opened. This is demonstrated by the request for preliminary ruling sent by the Court 
of Genoa and the ECJ’s ruling in Traghetti, which shakes the vary basis of the national 
regime of liability for judicial errors, namely the exclusion of liability for errors 
committed when interpreting the law49. Indeed, as shown above, under the new regime of 
liability, all misinterpretations of EC law committed by Italian courts adjudicating at last 
instance could potentially give rise to State liability, provided that the misinterpretation 
arises out of an inexcusable error. If Pandora’s box has been opened, it is submitted, 
however, that definitely not all the evil of the world came out of it for the Italian legal 
system. On the contrary, the ECJ’s ruling that State liability cannot be excluded for errors 
committed in the interpretation of the law and in the fact-finding activity could probably 
contribute to make the Italian judges more aware of EC law and the obligations it entails. 
 
More in general, it is submitted that these two cases may serve as good examples of the 
impact of the European jurisprudence on domestic remedies in the Italian legal system: 
where the national rules already provide for an adequate standard of protection, the 
European case law does not bring about radical changes to the existing law. Where, 
instead, the domestic procedural conditions do not allow for an adequate protection of 
individuals’ rights, the ECJ’s case law brings about a wind of change that, after some 
initial shock, is acknowledged as being beneficial and does eventually trigger changes 
also in the procedural conditions provided for merely domestic claims50. 
                                                 
49
 Of the same opinion L. de Bernardin, ‘La normativa italiana in tema di responsabilitá civile del 
magistrato a rischio davanti ai giudici di Lussemburgo’ in www.giustamm.it . 
50
 Most notably, this has happened in the context of the power of the administrative judge to grant positive 
interim measures. 
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